NTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE necessitates not only a mutual revealing of beliefs, symbols, and values, but an interior dialogue within each dialogue partner as well. In this interior dialogue the truths which are being revealed are weighed, tested, and, it is hoped, reconciled into each person's faith and commitment. The present essay's suggestion amounts to this: though most Christians are not directly involved in the HinduChristian dialogue in India, or the dialogues with the other great religions, few can without loss exempt themselves from an interior dialogue of their personal faith with the world religions. For it is clear that a plurality of great religions exists and will continue to exist; and, if it is meaningful to think in terms of God's plans, or actions in history, these religions did not come about by chance, nor are they irrelevant to us. Through the interior dialogue, then, we are all connected with the interreligious dialogues taking place around the world; and they are connected with us.
in India. The questions about God's grace and salvation vis-à-vis Hinduism (especially), he says, spring forth naturally for anyone who looks seriously. 4 And Ronald Prabhu, S.J., who has conducted many dialogue sessions at Ashirvad Retreat House in Bangalore, reports that Hindus would not, in general, be led to dialogue as something flowing naturally from their religious insight, although they are open to it when it is initiated. Rather, the need for dialogue flows straight out of his own Christian faith, in the form of a desire to see how God has manifested Himself in other religions. 5 This discovery of God in other religions, especially under the divine name "Truth," is one of the dialogue's most exciting facets. Finally, Raymond Panikkar sees dialogue as stemming from Christianity's most characteristic commandment: love of neighbor. He writes:
Dialogue is not bare methodology but an essential part of the religious act par excellence: loving God above all things and one's neighbor as oneself. If we believe that our neighbor lies entangled in falsehood and superstition we can hardly love him as ourselves. . . . Love for our neighbor also makes intellectual demands. 6 The Christian concern for the salvation of all, then, and the dialogue with the world's other religions which it has given rise to, are seen ultimately to stem from the foundational motives of the faith: love of God and love of neighbor.
A Soteriological Application
Against this background a question arises from my own Hindu-Christian dialogue experience. My experience has been with a learned Hindu guru, Shri Shyam M. Goswamy of Bombay, first as his student, but over many years now as a friend and informal dialogue partner as well. Shri Shyam was teaching me the doctrines of Vallabhäcärya (hereafter Vallabha), the theologian/saint who founded the Hindu system of which Shri Shyam is a guru. When we came to the question of Krishna's saving grace (for Krishna is the Supreme God in this system), Shri Shyam portrayed the tradition's teaching as follows:
Krishna's Grace is unlimited, and occurs anywhere and everywhere as Krishna wishes. Saving Grace not only occurs outside our system as well as within it, but we may even expect to be able to see traces of Krishna's Grace in other religions and cultures. What Vallabha has taught us is a Path of Grace which we are certain will lead us to salvation. In the trackless vastness of Krishna's Grace, therefore, Vallabha has demarcated this Path. It does not exhaust God's Grace, but it is our Path.
7
In the years since, I have thought about this teaching of Vallabha's especially when my reading touches upon the traditional dictum Extra ecclesiam nulla salus. After reading one such essay, 8 the following line of questioning began to crystallize. Though the Christian faith can proclaim itself to be universal, and indeed potentially be so-i.e., it can save all, or, more accurately, God can save all through it-cannot another faith, say Hinduism or Buddhism, also proclaim that it can save all, and will try to? The point is this: Is the further conclusion which Christians usually make justified: that, since all can be saved through faith in Christ, it is God's plan that salvation actually come to all people by this one path? Might this not be jumping to an unwarranted conclusion and attempting to limit the scope of God's grace? It is natural for a way of salvation to rejoice in itself and to spread itself by preaching and conversion. In fact, Buddhism and Vallabha's as well as other traditions of Hinduism, along with Christianity and Islam, have done this systematically. But does the joyful experience that here is an assured way of salvation automatically mean that God intends all to be saved by it? Certainly, many further questions are raised by this one-for example, the nature as well as the implications, psychological, social, and religious, of felt, intimately experienced salvation. There is also the question of New Testament passages which appear to teach that salvation comes through Jesus Christ alone.
9 But what has occurred to me as useful is to highlight this question against a new background. This line of thinking reminds me of Hans Küng's suggestion that we turn into a positive statement the negative dictum "Outside the Church no salvation," making it read instead "Salvation inside the Church!" 10 That this rightly joyful assurance means also that all must be saved in this way is what is questionable.
11
7 In line with this teaching, Shri Shyam, when he was the editor of the system's monthly journal, prepared for each issue a section which he entitled "Fragrance of Grace" (Hindi "Pusti Saurabh"). Typically, the section featured a quotation from the Bible, the Qur'än, or a saint of any tradition, which quotation showed clear evidence of God's grace and love. 12 But for our purposes no more is needed than a statement of the essence of sannyäsa, so that I can then make a suggestion about its role in inculturating the Christian churches of India.
Sannyäsa, then, is the renunciation of all forms and formulationssocial, cultural, religious-in order simply to "be" one with the Absolute. To this end the sannyäsi ritually (in his last ritual) interiorizes the sacrificial fires he had formerly fostered so carefully, dons the ochre robe, takes a new name (such as Abhishiktananda-"he whose Joy is the Anointed One"), leaves the caste system (and consequently, for example, is buried rather than cremated at death), wanders forth from home and family, etc. It is precisely his (or her, in some modern, and certainly in Christian, practice) essence to be bound by no rule, subject to no convention of this minutely ordered but provisional world. He is the pre- eminently free one-free to embody the Absolute, the Transcendent, the Beyond-free to be what we all are potentially and hope one day to be manifestly.
My line of questioning has to do with Christian sannyosisi Are the sannyäsis the most important people in the Indian Christian churches? Badly expressed, but put thus for this reason: perhaps only the sannyäsis will renounce totally the Western-church basis of their Christianity. In the case of all other Indian Christians, the Westernized Christian churches are still very much present, as a padding to fall back upon, as it were, if the attempts at inculturation do not work (or become tedious, or truly frightening). But what seems essential is so to commit oneself to inculturation that there is no other church to "come back to." In this context the sannyäsis may be the most important people, at least in terms of sign value, and perhaps also in fact; for a Christian sannyási would take, in effect, two sannyäsas 9 one from Indian culture and convention (i.e., from his "world") and another from Western-church convention. This latter renunciation might be characterized (to modify slightly a famous phrase from the Western tradition) as a life lived etsi Roma non daretur ("even though Rome"-by which I mean rhetorically to include all the Western churches-"be not assumed"). If some such thoroughness of commitment is not present in sannyäsis with or without the ochre robe, to speak of genuine indianization of the Church seems unrealistic.
Christology Revisited
My third consideration takes us to what, for most of the Christian participants at least, is the heart of the dialogue: the person and nature of Jesus Christ and his relation to the non-Christian religions. I do not intend to review the substantial and still growing literature which just the Hindu-Christian dialogue, not to mention the other dialogues, has generated on this subject; 13 but I note here a few ways in which Indian Christian theologians are speaking about Jesus Christ, and then make a critical comment.
Veteran dialogue participant Ignatius Hirudayam, S.J., pursued an illuminating line of thought when I spoke with him at his beautiful dialogue center, Aikiya Alayam, in Madras.
14 He pointed out that we Christians would be presumptuous if we assumed we knew the face of the present and future Christ and could describe him completely. This is precisely what we cannot do, he continued, with the cosmic Christ, the Christ of faith (who, I reflected, is the only Christ). Christ is present and working, with his Spirit, in every faith. And, he concluded, all salvation is through this Christ.
Again, Gispert-Sauch 15 gives us valuable background on these questions. According to him, many Indian Christian theologians would not accept the statement "Jesus is really unique as Christ* without qualification. 16 When I asked whether, in a contemplated theological conference which would have the question of the uniqueness of Christ as its focus, a uniqueness of Christ could not be taken for granted, while the modes of that uniqueness would be the conference's subject matter, GispertSauch said no. A uniqueness would not be allowed to be presumed; the presumption or presupposition of uniqueness would definitely be questioned and made a subject.
Let me exemplify this tendency from an important Indian Christian theologian. Panikkar has found the distinction between "Jesus" and "Christ" fruitful for the dialogue and dialogue theology. The advantage of such a distinction can be seen in a passage where he asserts that the basis for the universalism of Christianity "lies in the Christian conception of Christ: he is not only the historical redeemer, but also the unique Son of God ... the only ontological... link between God and the World." been describing. But, as occasionally a tendency shows itself to make Jesus the "Christ for Christians," as it were, while making "the Christ" the embodiment of the Absolute's self-revelation in all religions, the following question occurs to me. Is this the Christological counterpart of the ecclesiological move: outside the Church there is no salvation, therefore we define the Church as excluding no one? Together ^rith Küng, 19 1 find untenable the notion that we must keep expanding the Church's walls so as to include all people, even those who quite consciously want no part of being, or being called, Christian. Likewise, on the Christological level we may be attempting to redefine Christ so that he belongs to every faith. The question and caveat, then: Are we expanding the meaning of Christ beyond all meaningfulness? It may be true that Christ is present in all religions; but let us not,so drive a wedge between "Christ" and "Jesus of Nazareth" that our dialogue theology will ring true neither to Christians nor to non-Christians. Perhaps it is preferable to use some other theological categories, either traditional, such as the ecclesia ab Abel or the notion of a "cosmic religion," 20 or new. More likely it will prove best to continue, delicately, with the distinction-in-unity between Jesus and ("the") Christ. To lose patience with the complexities would be a mistake; for, to phrase the caveat in one final way, can anyone truly believe a "Christology" that does not have Jesus as its central exemplification?
Good Effects on Ecumenism?
The final consideration in this first part stems from a question I asked Ignatius Hirudayam in Madras. I have noticed for some years that, on the Christian side of the dialogue, most of the Catholics at least seem to have a personal preference, among the Hindu systems, for the Advaita Vedanta of Shankara. 21 Yet I knew that Hirudayam, whose dialogue has involved him predominantly with the more theistic Shaiva Siddhanta tradition, would likely have a fruitful difference of opinion from the advaitic majority. So I asked him whether he thought that the preference of so many Christian participants for Shankara's Advaita constitutes a problem for the Christian side of the dialogue. Shaiva Siddhanta terms: you followers of advaita (say the Shaivas) have been dazzled by what you have seen (the identity between Atman, "the Self," and Brahman, "the Absolute"), but you are like a frog which has jumped only three fourths of the way across a well! Come further, to the final union with Shiva, which is nondual but nonetheless does not destroy the I.
I found this answer partially helpful, in that it agreed with my fear that a strong preference for advaita might, ironically, start a new history of Hindu sectarianism among the Christians who are in dialogue; and partially unhelpful, in that it substituted a preference for another Hindu system over the advaita system. And the claims of these two systems cancel each other out perfectly; for just as the Shaiva theism claims to include the advaita experience, so does advaita claim to include, and then pass beyond, theism. So it could happen that one intolerant inclusivism would be exchanged for another.
But what seems more important is the further consideration which this inquiry prompted in me. Although a Christian's entry into dialogue may involve penetrating deeply into a particular Hindu system, Christians in the dialogue should not choose their personal "type" of Hinduism and act as if it is the only valid one. This would be the Hindu sectarian mistake (and a Hindu in dialogue could make the corresponding mistake by holding out strongly for one Christian sect over all the others). Perhaps, instead, one of the unexpected fruits of the dialogue will be the other religion's teaching us how to live tolerantly with the differences of doctrine, church, sect, etc., within our own religion, and our teaching them how to tolerate theirs. If our partners in dialogue can enter profoundly into our religion and yet tolerate our differences, and we tolerate theirs, perhaps we can show each other how to heal the differences within our own folds. Thus "the wider ecumenism," as Eugene Hillman calls Christianity's dialogue with the other religions of the world, would help bring about ecumenism within one's own religion. This is rather unexpected, and at least a bit idealistic, but it does not seem impossible.
THE INTERIOR DIALOGUE

Definition
Now that we have experienced something of the atmosphere and central questions of the Hindu-Christian dialogue, it should be possible to define the interior dialogue more clearly and to consider some ways of going about it. "Interior dialogue" is a term I am suggesting as a substitute for the other two terms ("inner dialogue" and "intrareligious dialogue") by which I have seen this phenomenon designated. 22 Robinson provides some background and clarification for the first term:
... what Murray Rogers calls 'the inner dialogue' which is a precondition of the outer and for which the terms are the same. And it is from this inner dialogue, if not from the exposure required for the outer, that this book has been born and to which it forms an invitation.
23
Inner dialogue, then, refers to the entire process and impulse which lead one to desire outer or interreligious dialogue. In addition, inner dialogue refers to the effects of outer dialogue on one's own faith-effects which take place before, during, and after outer dialogue. Panikkar gives us a more complete explanation of the phenomenon, which he calls the "intrareligious dialogue":
Interreligious dialogue is today unavoidable; it is a religious imperative and a historical duty for which we must suitably prepare. But we often hear more talk about interreligious dialogue than actual dialogue. In order to sidestep this pitfall, I would like to begin by stressing the often-neglected notion of an intrareligious dialogue, i.e., an inner dialogue within myself, an encounter in the depth of my personal religiousness, having met another religious experience on that very intimate level. In other words, if interreligious dialogue is to be real dialogue, an intrareligious dialogue must accompany it tion than "inner," and simultaneously it is less complicated and unclear than "intrareligious." The interior dialogue, then, is the interaction, the testing, and, with the help of grace, the reconciliation within one's personal faith of the beliefs, symbols, and values of the different faith system which one is deeply considering.
On the Importance of Being Two-Eyed Probably the best way to present the suggestions I make toward a theology of the interior dialogue is to divide them into two areas: how to see and how to believe. The first question is one of perception: how to view the interrelation between one's own religion and the other religion being considered. It would, of course, be dishonest to proceed in an a priori manner here, as if one could prepackage all one is going to see. Yet there is an incipient consensus among dialogue participants on how best to see. To know this way of perceiving is much more helpful than to be dropped anew, as it were, into this complicated panorama.
To be concrete: dialogue theologian Ignatius Puthiadam sees a "complementarity'' between Hindu and Christian truths. It is not new to see, for example, Hinduism as stressing the eternal while Christianity stresses the historical. But it is new to perceive that this complementarity can be expected, and even described in a systematic way. Puthiadam sees such a complementarity both between the different moods he experiences while praying in a Hindu temple and a Christian church and between the major theological truths of the two religions. He perceives a "principle of complementarity" by which he discovers not only "the unknown Christ and Christianity of Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism, but the unknown Hinduism, Buddhism and Jainism of Christianity." 25 Similarly, Ignatius Hirudayam sees, in grand historical perspective, the various world religions as mutually corrective thought systems and movements.
But the most vivid formulation of this way of seeing comes from a newcomer to the field of dialogue, John A. T. Robinson, whose Truth Is Two-Eyed has brought acknowledged illumination to such professionals as Antoine. Robinson's title refers to the way of seeing he proposes. But it is not actually truth that is two-eyed; rather, it is the observer who must hold two quite different, apparently opposed eyes in steady focus on truth. "I-Thou") and the nondual (as in "That art thou"). 27 The great virtue of the "two eyes" image is the simultaneity of different angles of vision it stresses. In this it surpasses complementarity, in which the two (or more) elements, though both essential, might be viewed one after the other. If the prophetic and mystical eyes view a religious truth simultaneously, then even the dominance of one eye over the other which often enough occurs will not distort one's religious vision.
For example, consider the uniqueness of Christ, a major sticking point of the Hindu-Christian dialogue and of other religions' dialogues with Christianity. The prophetic eye, often dominant in Christianity, stresses the historicity and uniqueness of Christ, that he is u once for all," while the mystical eye, so typical of Hinduism, provides the necessary scope for Christ's universality, that he is "once for aU" If both were not present, emphasis on historical uniqueness would render universality less and less credible. Or, conversely, Christ would be so cosmic as to lose all concreteness. So, the two-eyed view of Christ is that he is unique and universal.
28
This example should shed light on the possible problem I outlined earlier, that of separating "Jesus" from "Christ." Overemphasis of the historical and unique would leave us with only Jesus, while similar insistence on universality yields a faceless, placeless Christ. Both "unique" and "universal" are true-true, in fact, in a way analogous, and not coincidentally, to "true God and true man." But to insist on one at the other's expense would distort the truth. Two-eyedness, as also complementarity, does not mean that everything is correct and nothing wrong, or vice versa. It is a means of weighing a religious statement, experience, etc., from each of two fruitful but different perspectives, one of which may show a richness and validity to which the other was blind. It may not be excessive to say that the epistemology of religious knowing, especially in terms of the interior dialogue, has been broadened by this simple image, which encourages us to expect both the prophetic and the mystical, in mutually illuminating and mutually corrective ways. Far from inducing spiritual schizophrenia, this two-eyedness would make each of us attend to the full range of vision of the human spirit, and not our usual, more comfortable, partial range. nowhere else; for there Jesus speaks of his Father, himself, and his disciples as being related in a nondual way. Griffiths explains this phenomenon (using the word "identity" as I have been using the word "nonduality," though elsewhere the two do not always mean the same) as follows:
One final connection with respect to this way of seeing, a synthetic insight which Bede Griffiths has expressed in his
His [Christ's] was an experience of identity in relationship. He does not say, I am the Father-that he could never say-but a I and the Father are one" (John 10.30). It is a unity in duality, by which he can say, "I am in the Father and the Father in me" (John 14.10), which is yet based on an identity of being, by which he can say "He who sees me, sees the Father" (John 14.9). It is the experience of the Absolute in personal relationship, and that would seem to be the distinctive character of the Christian experience of God.
Thus, in John, the relational a I-Thou" and the nondual "That art thou" are not finally opposite or even separate, but mutually present in Jesus, the Father, and, ideally, all human persons. It has long been sensed that the Gospel of John is the key New Testament writing for the HinduChristian dialogue. 30 We have here good evidence as to how its way of seeing illumines the interior dialogue as well. position or belief as involving assent to the truth of that position, and even as leading to conversion to that position. The following seems to constitute his fullest statement of his thesis:
Faith and Beliefs
The next step [in dialogue] is to understand the other's position, and at once a tremendous difficulty arises. I can never understand his position as he doesand this is the only real understanding between people-unless I share his view; in a word, unless I judge it to be somewhat true When I say I understand a proposition and consider it untrue, in the first place I do not understand it because, by definition, truth alone is intelligible (if I understand a thing I always understand it sub ratione veritatis); in the second place I certainly do not understand it in the way of someone who holds it to be true. Accordingly, to understand is to be converted to the truth one understands.
31
Let us look at Panikkar's major assertion and, equally important, at its language. A person in dialogue must endeavor to understand the dialogue partner's religious position as the partner himself does. If this effort succeeds, the first person assents in some way to the truth of the partner's position-and this to such a degree that it might even be said he is converted to the truth of the position. My response is that Panikkar is speaking of something profoundly true, but that the language of "conversion," though experientially correct, may be confusing theologically.
That one must, in dialogue (interior as well as interreligious), strive to understand the partner's religion as he understands it is the only position that makes sense upon reflection. Otherwise a person may simply read his own religious categories into a very different religion. And that, when the process of understanding succeeds, the person judges the partner's position to be in some way true, both I and many others who have been in dialogue can attest. The problem is with the use of the term "conversion," because this term has for so long connoted the abandoning of one position and the embracing of a new belief as "the truth." But I am quite certain that Panikkar means embracing a newly discovered truth without a presumptive necessity of abandoning a former belief which supposedly covered the same ground. Perhaps this is new ground that simply was not covered, or known of, before. Hence the joy of discovery and conversion to truth is real; but the idea of rejection and replacement that "conversion" often connotes is not present.
Panikkar, well aware after much feedback of the difficulty of communicating this important dialogue experience, is considering the possibilities of the idea of "conviction," perhaps especially of an archaic English noun, "convincement," for carrying his meaning.
32 And so the formulation of this, one of the most exciting and important experiences of dialogue, is not yet complete or satisfactory. But though the word may not yet be there, the thing is, and "conversion" is not so much a wrong term as a potentially confusing one. Lastly, for completeness' sake, it should be pointed out that Panikkar does not anticipate a hasty, unimpeded attainment by dialogue partners of "understanding" and "conversion" with regard to every belief of their respective religions. Moreover, understanding should never be pretended where it does not exist. Instead, the beliefs not understood are the matter for continuing dialogue, whose end has scarcely been contemplated as yet.
33
To apply this line of thinking to our example: I, for one, certainly have not had the definitive experience that Ätman is Brahman, the act of complete knowledge which, according to Hindu tradition, brings final release from the round of rebirths. But it would be accurate to say that I have had a passing but profound illumination of its truth, some perception of and some effect of which remain with me. This is the truth that I "assent to," or, if the language be properly qualified, am "converted to. faith. While beliefs composed of human language are integral to a person's expression of his faith to himself and others, and therefore integral to his faith, beliefs do not reach to and adequately express the term or object of faith, i.e., God, or the Transcendent, while faith does indeed reach and relate to its object. More briefly: faith really relates to the Infinite, while beliefs are the finite expressions of that relation, which by the very fact Of being finite cannot capture the Object of faith.
35
Beliefs are necessary for faith, but they are not identical with faith. In a homogeneous cultural world, in which dogmas are often taken to be faith itself rather than dogmas of faith, beliefs will be thought to be identical with faith. It is in a world of dialogue that the distinction between faith and beliefs, between the transcendence of faith and the relativity, though not relativism, of beliefs, becomes important.
36
Similarly, Lonergan contends that "by distinguishing faith and belief we have secured a basis both for ecumenical encounter and for an encounter between all religions with a basis in religious experience."
37
For Lonergan, "Faith is the knowledge born of religious love," 38 while belief is the expression-again, a human necessity partially constitutive of faith-of that knowledge. These beliefs can be different in different cultures and epochs, and yet stem from a deeper unity of faith and love.
39
Once again, then, a distinction between faith and beliefs is seen as essential for a world in dialogue. The immediate intention of Lonergan's distinction may be to render intelligible how two very different sets of beliefs stem from a faith and love whose Source is the same. But the distinction seems applicable to our present problem too: the question of whether another religion's belief, now seen as stemming from that profound faith and love that grounds beliefs, can be affirmed as in some way true for aü who see it.
To frame the same question, this essay's final question, with the help of Panikkar's terms: What does the distinction between faith and beliefs have to do with the interior dialogue? Precisely this: those truths which I have understood, assented to, even "been converted to" in dialogue of either kind, can now become beliefs which express my faith believe in them, that they express my faith.
40
I can anticipate an objection, and I cannot yet answer it entirely. Do I mean that everyone can believe everything that seems to them noncontradictory to their own religion? This possible extreme of individual interpretation must, it seems to me, be avoided. Yet Γ am starting from the other end: there must be some scope for believing some of the truths one discovers so genuinely in dialogue. Panikkar's and Lonergan's dis tinctions between faith and beliefs, and my presentation of this question for both the interreligious and the interior dialogue, may afford a begin ning of discourse on this phenomenon.
What we dialogue theologians are endeavoring to do, then, is to lay a Christian theological foundation for a very important aspect of our experience: our perceived belief in teachings of religions other than our own Christianity.
41
1 have used belief in the Ätman/Brahman identity as an example which applies to me, and which must have been true at a far deeper level for Abhishiktananda, among others. There is clearly much to be thought out on how the different beliefs we hold harmonize. Perhaps aesthetic thinking can help us more than discursive thinking here. Perhaps, for example, there are different moods and moments of faith experience for which different beliefs are more or less relevant, or "right." This beginning of a thought I hope to develop elsewhere. Meanwhile, the distinction between faith and beliefs makes room within Christian theological categories for an experience that is more and more frequent in dialogue: truth is being perceived, discovered, recognized; and there must be room for that truth in my Christian faith.
This must suffice for now. I hope that my suggestions concerning soteriology, the place of the sannyasi, the crucial relation of " Jesus" and "the Christ," and the wider ecumenical possibilities of freedom from sectarianism will be found helpful by my colleagues in the HinduChristian dialogue. Further, I hope that those many inquirers engaged, all over the world, in what I have proposed to name the interior dialogue will find that these thoughts on how to see and how to believe, enriched by appropriation through their own experience, can combine to form an incipient theology of that same interior dialogue. 40 My expressing this conclusion in an individualistic way reflects merely the dominant present mode of dialogue experience, and in no way intends to exclude rich communitarian insight, language, and action in dialogue.
41 Panikkar witnesses to this: M It is precisely because I take seriously Christ's affirmation that he is the way, the truth and the life that I cannot reduce his significance only to historical Christianity. It is because I also take seriously the saying of the Gita that all action done with a good intention reaches Krsna and the message of the Buddha that he points the way to liberation, that I look for an approach to the encounter with religions that will contain not only a deep respect for but an enlightened confidence in these very traditions-and eventually belief in their messages" (The Intrareligious Dialogue 54).
